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Abstract 
 
 Pain disrupts attention in order to prioritise avoidance of harm and promote analgesic 
behaviour. This could in turn have negative effects on higher-level cognitions which rely on 
attention. In the current paper we examined the effect of thermal pain induction on three 
measures of reasoning: the Cognitive Reflection Test, Belief Bias Syllogisms task, and 
Conditional Inference task. In Experiment 1, the thermal pain was set at each participant’s 
pain threshold. In Experiment 2, it was set to a minimum of 44°C or 7/10 on a VAS scale 
(whichever was higher). In Experiment 3, performance was compared in no pain, low 
intensity pain, and high intensity pain conditions. We predicted that the experience of pain 
would reduce correct responding on the reasoning tasks. However, this was not supported in 
any of the three studies. We discuss possible interpretations of our failure to reject the null 
hypothesis and the importance of publishing null results. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Pain disrupts attention, which in turn is important for logical reasoning. However, across 
three experiments, induced pain did not affect participants’ logical reasoning behaviour. 
 
 
Keywords: 
Pain; Cognition; Reasoning; Logic; Disruption; Executive function; Cognitive Intrusion. 
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1. Introduction 
There is evidence that pain disrupts attention [4; 6-8; 27; 32; 33; 44; 46], but the 
impact of pain on higher-level cognitive processes is less-investigated (although see 
[1,23,28]).  It is unclear whether we should expect higher-level tasks to also be affected by 
pain. Tasks which draw on multiple attention processes and executive functions which are 
themselves disrupted by pain may see an additive disruptive effect. Alternatively, 
performance on these tasks may be protected. It is possible that some of the attention 
processes involved are able to compensate for the disruption to others. It is also possible that 
the tasks are more engaging for participants which motivates them to focus their attention on 
the task rather than the pain [45].  
Here, we investigated the effect of pain on logical reasoning. Reasoning encompasses 
many domains, but can broadly be thought of as the process of drawing inferences from 
available information. Reasoning is often understood in terms of dual processes. Type 1 
processing is autonomous whereas Type 2 processing requires working memory [10; 15]. 
While Type 1 processing is highly efficient and effective, many tasks in modern life require 
Type 2 processing, in particular, novel, abstract and complex tasks such as choosing the best 
insurance plan or deciding whether one is eligible for benefit schemes [37]. Such tasks might 
require calculating and comparing costs and probabilities, or interpreting conjunctions of 
conditional statements, and Type 2 processing is essential for performing these tasks 
optimally. Any factors that systematically reduce the engagement of Type 2 processes during 
reasoning may, therefore, impact on the quality of life of the individual. Factors known to 
reduce Type 2 thinking on reasoning tasks include time pressure [12; 13; 22] and working 
memory load [20; 21]. However, Type 2 processing can also be increased by instruction 
variations [14] and prompts that indicate task difficulty [5]. 
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This is the first investigation of the effect of pain on logical reasoning that we are 
aware of, and we began by selecting three tasks that measure different types of reasoning: the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT[19]), the Belief Bias Syllogisms Task [37], and the 
Conditional Inference Task [9]. We took the approach of investigating three tasks, rather than 
focusing on one, because reasoning is an inherently broad concept. The CRT questions 
prompt intuitive but incorrect responses (resulting from Type 1 processing), the error of 
which can be spotted and corrected on reflection (with Type 2 processes). Responses 
therefore indicate a participant’s tendency to spontaneously engage Type 2 thinking. The 
syllogisms task requires participants to set aside their prior beliefs (which come from Type 1 
processes) and decide whether conclusions follow logically (requiring Type 2 processing) 
from syllogisms that are framed in believable, unbelievable or neutral context. The 
Conditional Inference task requires participants to decide whether conclusions follow 
logically from abstract conditional statements, making it a ‘purer’ measure of logical 
reasoning ability, free from context. We predicted that pain would reduce logical responding 
on all three tasks.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1.Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 60 students and staff (29 males, 31 females) from the University of 
Bath and Bath Spa University, aged 18-58 years (M = 26.17, SD = 8.73). All reported being 
free from pain at the time of the study.  
  
2.1.2. Design 
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Participants completed three reasoning tasks and we investigated the effect of pain on 
performance on each task. The Cognitive Reflection Test was administered first, with pain 
condition as a counterbalanced between-participants factor. Participants then completed two 
forms of the Belief Bias Syllogisms and Conditional Inference tasks, one form of each while 
experiencing heat pain and one form of each while pain-free (i.e. within-groups). The order 
of tasks and pain conditions was counterbalanced, with participants completing one of the 
following four orders: 1) syllogisms pain, syllogisms no-pain, conditionals pain, conditionals 
no-pain, 2) syllogisms no-pain, syllogisms pain, conditionals no-pain, conditionals pain, 3) 
conditionals pain, conditionals no-pain, syllogisms pain, syllogisms no-pain, 4) conditionals 
no-pain, conditionals pain, syllogisms no-pain, syllogisms pain. 
 
2.1.3. Measures 
2.1.3.1. Cognitive Reflection Test 
Participants completed the original three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT[19]) 
plus the four new items developed by Toplak, West and Stanovich [41] on paper, either with 
or without pain. For each item there is an intuitive but incorrect response. If a participant 
inhibits this intuitive response, they can fairly easily calculate the correct response. For 
example, in the well-known bat and ball problem from the original three items, "A bat and a 
ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?", 
the intuitive answer is 10 cents while the correct answer is 5 cents.  
The CRT is a popular measure in dual-processes research because it is thought to 
indicate an individual's likelihood to override Type 1 processing (which results in the 
intuitive response) with Type 2 processing (which in the case of the CRT usually leads to the 
correct response). Toplak, West and Stanovich [40] found the CRT to be a better predictor of 
normative responding to reasoning tasks than cognitive ability, executive function, or the 
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Actively Openminded Thinking scale, supporting its utility. The CRT was administered to 
each participant once, with or without pain, with conditions counterbalanced.  
 
2.1.3.2. Belief Bias Syllogisms Task 
The Belief Bias Syllogisms task [37] was used as a measure of the ability to reason 
independently of prior beliefs. The original 24 items were split into two equivalent 12-item 
forms [3] to allow us to give participants opposite forms in each pain condition. The order of 
forms and conditions was counterbalanced.  
Each form consisted of 12 thematic syllogisms, four congruent (believable-valid, 
unbelievable-invalid), four incongruent (believable-invalid, unbelievable-valid) and four 
neutral (nonsense-valid, nonsense-invalid). An invalid syllogism with a believable conclusion 
is "All living things need water; Roses need water; Therefore, roses are living things". 
Participants decided whether each syllogism was logically valid or not after being instructed 
to ignore their prior beliefs. We measured the number of items endorsed for each item type 
(believable valid, believable invalid etc.) in each condition.  
 
2.1.3.3. Conditional Inference Task 
Participants completed 16 items from Evans, Clibbens and Rood's version of the 
Conditional Inference Task[9]. The task consists of abstract inferences of four forms: Modus 
Ponens (MP: if p then q; p; q), Denial of the Antecedent (DA: if p then q; not p; not q), 
Affirmation of the Consequent (AC: if p then q; q; p) and Modus Tollens (MT: if p then q; 
not q; not p). MP and MT inferences are considered valid and DA and AC inferences 
considered invalid under the normative model of the conditional inference task. An example 
Modus Tollens item is: "If the letter is K then the number is 5; The number is not 5; 
Therefore, the letter is not K". Participants completed the 16 items that had explicit rather 
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than implicit negations in the premises (i.e. “The number is not 5” rather than “The number is 
7” in the example above).  
The lexical content of the rules was generated randomly and varied between two 
forms of the task. Each participant performed one form while in pain and the other while pain 
free, with pain condition and form counterbalanced.  The task was presented on E-Prime 
Professional 2.0 with the order of items randomized for each participant. Participants 
responded to each item by pressing the leftmost button on a serial response box to indicate 
that the 'conclusion follows', or the rightmost button on the response box to indicate that the 
'conclusion does not follow'. The task was preceded by the instructions used by Evans et al 
(1995).  
 
2.1.3.4. VAS scales 
At the end of the study, participants completed 10 cm Visual Analogue Scales on 
paper for the following questions: "How painful was the heat?" (anchored by "No pain at all" 
and "Unbearable pain"), "How much pain did you feel when the heat pain was at its most 
intense?" (anchored by "No pain at all" and "Unbearable pain"), and "How 
intrusive/distracting did the pain seem to you?" (anchored by "Not at all distracting" and 
"Very distracting"). 
 
2.1.3.5. Pain induction 
A Medoc Pathway Advanced Thermal Stimulator (ATS) was used for the purpose of 
heat pain induction. This equipment is designed for use in clinical and research settings and 
has built-in safety restrictions. The pain induction protocol began by determining the 
participant's pain threshold, and the subsequent pain induction during the reasoning tasks was 
tailored to this threshold. 
Reasoning in pain  
 
8 
 The thermode, measuring 30  30mm, was attached to the participant's non-dominant 
arm over the extensor digitorum muscle, approximately 5cm above the wrist joint. The 
baseline temperature of the thermode was set at 32C and participants were asked to increase 
the temperature using the manual trigger until it first felt painful (i.e. reached the pain 
threshold). If the heat remained painful but tolerable for 15 seconds, this temperature was 
recorded as the threshold. Otherwise, the temperature was adjusted until this criterion was 
satisfied. Once the threshold was determined the heat stimulus was returned to the baseline 
temperature. This procedure was repeated three times, and the mean threshold temperature 
was taken as the participants' heat pain threshold.  
The pain induction procedure during the tasks was a pulses programme in which the 
thermode temperature fluctuated between 1°C below and above the participant’s pain 
threshold in cycles of 10. Each cycle of 10 pulses lasted for 5 seconds. Between each cycle, 
there was a 3 second return to baseline, before the next cycle of 10 fluctuations around the 
threshold. After a participant’s pain threshold had been determined, but before they started 
the tasks, they experienced the pulses programme tailored to their threshold for 30 seconds 
and were asked to verbally report whether or not the heat was painful but tolerable. Eighteen 
participants reported that the pulses programme was not painful, and the temperatures were 
then increased one degree at a time and the 30-second programme repeated until the 
participant reported that they experienced pain. Three participants reported that the pulses 
programme was too painful, and the temperatures were then decreased one degree at a time 
and the 30-second programme repeated until the participant reported that they experienced 
tolerable pain. The remaining 39 participants reported that the pulses programme was painful 
but tolerable on the initial demonstration. 
 
2.1.4. Procedure 
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Ethical approval for the study was granted from the University of Bath Department of 
Psychology and Department for Health ethics boards. After giving informed consent, the 
participants’ heat pain threshold was determined as described above. Next, participants 
completed the CRT task with or without pain, then the syllogisms and conditional inference 
tasks twice, once while pain free and once while experiencing the painful heat stimulus.  
After completing the reasoning tasks participants completed the VAS scales on paper 
and some demographics questions on the computer using E-Prime Professional 2.0.  When all 
tasks had been completed the participants were paid and debriefed. 
 
2.2. Results 
The key frequentist analyses below are followed up by Bayesian analyses.  
For ANOVAs with two or fewer within-subjects factors we report Generalized Eta 
Squared (ηG2) as a measure of effect size, as recommended by Lakens [29], in addition to 
Partial Eta Squared (ηp2). For analyses with more than two within-subjects factors, we report 
only ηp2 [29]. 
  
2.2.1. Data availability 
The data and SPSS analysis scripts for these experiments are available at 
https://figshare.com/s/a55106b572b7c4a1329d. 
 
2.2.2. Data cleaning 
One participant’s syllogisms data and another participant’s CRT data were removed 
due to an error in administration. 
 
2.2.3. Pain threshold and VAS ratings 
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The mean pain threshold was 43.68°C (SD = 3.35), and was significantly higher in 
males (M = 44.68°C, SD = 2.94) than in females (M = 42.67°C, SD = 3.46), t(58) = 2.43, p = 
.018, d = .62. The mean VAS response to the question “How much pain did you feel during 
the pain condition of the task?” was 58.12 out of 100 (SD = 16.52), ranging from 17 to 88, 
which was significantly different from zero, t(59) = 27.25, p < .001, d = 3.52. The mean 
response to the question “How much pain did you feel when the heat pain was at its most 
intense?” was 68.67 (SD = 14.55), which was also significantly different from zero, t(59) = 
36.56, p < .001, d = 4.72. Finally, the mean response to the question “How 
intrusive/distracting did the pain seem to you?” was 57.72 (SD = 23.49), which again was 
significantly different from zero, t(59) = 19.03, p < .001, d = 2.46. None of the VAS ratings 
differed by sex (all ps > .13). These results suggest that participants perceived the heat 
stimulus to be painful and that they perceived this pain to be distracting. 
 
2.2.4. The effect of pain on task performance 
2.2.4.1. CRT 
Given that the CRT7 includes four new items which are relatively untested, we 
examined scores on the original three items and well as scores on the full seven items. The 
number of correct answers for each measure was compared across the pain and no pain 
conditions with Mann-Whitney U tests. For CRT3 scores, there was no difference between 
the pain (M = .97, SD = 1.12) and no pain (M = 1.27, SD = 1.20) conditions, U(59) = 372.5, 
z = 1.00, p = .318, r = .130. For CRT7 scores, there was again no difference between the pain 
(M = 2.62, SD = 2.09) and no pain (M = 3.30, SD = 2.20) conditions, U(59) = 353, z = 1.26, 
p = .208, r = .164.  
We also conducted Bayesian Mann-Whitney U tests on the effects of pain on CRT3 
and CRT7 scores with a default Cauchy prior of 0.707. For CRT3 scores there was anecdotal 
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evidence in favour of the null, BF_01 = 2.65, and for CRT7 scores there was anecdotal 
evidence in favour of the null, BF_01 = 1.83. 
Within the pain group, there was a significant negative correlation between CRT3 
scores and self-reported average pain intensity, rs (29) = -.508, p = .005, and a significant 
negative correlation between CRT7 scores and self-reported average pain intensity, rs (29) = -
.462, p = .012; the more intense the pain, the fewer correct answers participants gave. 
Bayesian correlations between pain intensity scores and CRT3 scores, and between pain 
intensity scores and CRT7 scores, indicated strong evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypotheses, BF_10 = 56.61 and BF_10 = 18.16, respectively. 
 
2.2.4.2. Belief Bias Syllogisms 
Endorsement rates for the syllogisms were entered into a 2 (pain condition: pain, no 
pain)  3 (believability: believable, neutral, unbelievable)  2 (validity: valid, invalid)  2 
(sex: female, male) ANOVA. Importantly, this replicated the usual findings associated with 
the task. There was a significant main effect of believability, F(2,114) = 20.10, p < .001, ηp2  
= .261. As expected, participants endorsed believable conclusions (M = 76.3%, SD = 22.5) 
more often than neutral conclusions (M = 67.6%, SD = 23.2), p = .001, and neutral 
conclusions more often than unbelievable conclusions (M = 57.4%, SD = 27.9), p = .001. 
There was also a significant main effect of validity, F(1,57) = 77.18, p < .001,  ηp2 = .575. 
Participants endorsed valid conclusions (M = 86.6%, SD = 14.7) more often than invalid 
conclusions (M = 47.6%, SD = 34.9), again as expected.  
There was a significant interaction between believability and validity, F(2,114) = 
11.26, p < .001,  ηp2  = .165 (Figure 1). Further investigation showed that there was a main 
effect of believability on endorsement rates both within the valid items, F(2,116) = 11.49, p < 
.001,  ηp2 = .165, and within the invalid items, F(2,116) = 22.95, p < .001  ηp2 = .284. There 
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were significant differences between believable, neutral and unbelievable items within both 
the valid and invalid items, all ps < .041. Notably, believable items were highly endorsed, 
more often than would be expect by chance, whether they were valid (M = 91.1%, SD = 
14.7), p < .001 or invalid (M = 61.4%, SD = 36.4), p = .018. Unbelievable items, however, 
were endorsed more often than would be expect by chance when they were valid, (M = 
77.5%, SD = 29.4), p < .001, but less often than would be expected by chance when they 
were invalid, (M = 37.3%, SD = 38.0), p = .012. This replicates findings from previous 
investigations of the task, which are interpreted as ‘selective scrutiny’ of unbelievable 
inferences[10]. Believable inferences tend to be highly endorsed whether they are valid or 
invalid, but unbelievable inferences are subjected to extra scrutiny with Type 2 processing, 
which leads to them being endorsed when they are valid and rejected when they are invalid.  
There were no main effects or interactions involving pain or sex (all ps > .052, ηp2 < 
.065).  
We also conducted a Bayesian ANOVA on Syllogisms endorsement rates with 
Believability, Validity, Pain Condition and Sex as factors. We used Rouder et al.’s [36] 
default prior width of h = 0.5, which captures the range of effect sizes typically found in the 
behavioural sciences. This revealed that the best-fitting model included Belief, Validity and a 
Belief  Validity interaction, P(model|data) = .52. There was moderate evidence against the 
model that additionally included pain, BF_01 = 5.77, and very strong evidence against the 
model that included pain, its interactions with Belief and Validity, and the three-way 
interaction, BF_01 = 10024. 
Given that the level of pain experienced varied widely between participants (from 17 
to 88 on a VAS scale of 0 to 100) we ran some exploratory analyses to investigate the effect 
of pain intensity on performance in the pain condition. For responses in the pain condition 
only, we calculated a Total Correct score and a Belief Bias Index, which reflects participants’ 
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tendency to reason based on believability over logical validity ([number of believable valid 
items endorsed + number of unbelievable invalid items endorsed] – [number of believable 
invalid items endorsed + number of unbelievable valid items endorsed]) [37]. Total Correct 
scores were not correlated with Pain Intensity, r(59) = -.176, p = .183, but Belief Bias Index 
scores were significantly positively correlated with Pain Intensity, rs(59) = .345, p = .007. 
This suggests that the higher a participant’s pain intensity, the more swayed they were by the 
believability of the syllogisms.  
A Bayesian Pearson’s correlation between Pain Intensity and Total Correct syllogisms 
score found anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis, BF_01 = 2.589. A Bayesian 
Kendall’s tau-b correlation between Pain Intensity and Belief Bias Index found moderate 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis, BF_10 = 15.19. 
 
2.2.4.3. Conditional Inference Task 
 Conditional inference endorsement rates were entered into a 2 (condition: pain, no 
pain) x 4 (inference: MP, DA, AC, MT) x 2 (sex: male, female) ANOVA. There was a 
significant main effect of Inference, F(3,174) = 54.61, p < .001,  ηp2 = .485, ηG2 = .275, with 
MP inferences being endorsed more often (M = 98.1%, SD = 5.1) than AC inferences (M = 
73.5%, SD = 33.8), p < .001, which in turn were endorsed more often than MT inferences (M 
= 65.0%, SD = 26.9), p = .029, which were endorsed more often than DA inferences (M = 
52.7%, SD = 25.0), p = .002. There were no main effects of pain or sex nor any interactions 
(all ps > .246, ηp2 < .024, ηG2 < .006).  
We conducted a Bayesian ANOVA with Inference, Pain Condition and Sex as factors. 
We used Rouder et al.’s [36] default prior width of h = 0.5, which captures the range of effect 
sizes typically found in the behavioural sciences. This revealed that the best-fitting model 
included only Inference type, P(model|data)=.67. There was moderate evidence against the 
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model that additionally included pain, BF_01=8.06, and very strong evidence against the 
model that included Pain, Sex and all associated interactions, BF_01=1,525,000. 
Next, as with the Syllogisms scores, we ran exploratory analyses investigating the 
relationships between pain intensity and conditional inference endorsement rates in the pain 
condition only. Pain Intensity was not correlated with the number of items endorsed for any 
inference type: MP rs(60) = -.166, p = .205, DA rs(60) = .231, p = .076, AC rs(60) = .234, p = 
.071, MT rs(60) = .185, p = .158. 
 
2.3. Experiment 1 Discussion 
Experiment 1 did not support our primary hypothesis that participants’ performance 
on the reasoning tasks would be poorer when they were in pain compared to when they were 
pain-free. However, some exploratory analyses suggested that higher intensity pain may 
affect reasoning more than low intensity pain. We observed a negative correlation between 
pain intensity and the number of CRT items answered correctly. On the syllogisms task, the 
higher a participant’s self-reported pain intensity was, the more their responses relied on the 
believability of the syllogisms over their logical validity.  
These exploratory analyses do not provide evidence for an effect of pain on reasoning, 
but they suggest that our failure to support our hypotheses may have been due to our pain 
manipulation being inadequate. In Experiment 2, participants completed the CRT and 
Syllogisms task again, but we improved our pain manipulation by increasing the thermode 
temperature to ensure that all participants experienced moderate pain. We predicted that this 
would lead to a main effect of pain on CRT scores, and an interaction between pain, validity, 
and believability on the Syllogisms task. We did not include the Conditional Inference Task 
because we wanted to make the testing sessions shorter due to the higher intensity pain 
induction, and the theoretical reasons to expect performance on this task to be affected by 
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pain were not as strong as for the CRT and Syllogisms tasks, on which responding patterns 
more clearly differ depending on the extent of Type 1 vs Type 2 thinking participants used. 
On the Conditional Inference Task, it is less clear exactly how response patterns would 
change if pain affected participants’ reasoning – there is no clear “default” choice between 
responding “yes” or “no” when relying on Type 1 thinking. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 46 students and staff (20 males, 26 females) from the University of 
Bath and Bath Spa University, aged 18-34 years (M = 22.98, SD = 4.59). All reported being 
free from pain at the time of the study.  
 
3.1.2. Design 
Participants completed the CRT and Belief Bias Syllogisms tasks and we investigated 
the effect of pain on performance on each task. The Cognitive Reflection Test was 
administered first, with pain condition as a counterbalanced between-participants factor. 
Participants then completed the Belief Bias Syllogisms task twice, once while experiencing 
heat pain and once while pain free. The order of pain conditions was counterbalanced.  
 
3.1.3. Pain induction 
A Medoc Pathway Advanced Thermal Stimulator (ATS) was again used for heat pain 
induction. The same pulses programme was used as in Study 1, where the temperature 
increased and fluctuated by 2°C for 5 seconds, with 3-second returns to the baseline 
temperature of 32°C, before pulsing at the higher temperatures again. However, in this study, 
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the pulsing temperatures were set to at least 44°C and 46°C in the pain condition, with the 
same baseline of 32°C. At the start of the experiment, participants rated how painful they 
found this on a Numerical Rating Scale (NRS) where 0 was labelled ‘no pain at all’ and 10 
was labelled ‘unbearable pain’. If the participant rated it as lower than 7/10 on the NRS, the 
temperatures were increased by 1°C and the NRS repeated. This continued until a 
temperature was found that participants rated as 7/10 or higher, using increments or 
decrements of half a degree where necessary to find a bearable temperature rated at least 
7/10. In the warm condition, the pulsing temperatures were set at 39°C and 41°C and the 
baseline was again 32°C. This gave participants a similar sensation of fluctuating 
temperatures to the pain condition, but without pain. 
 
3.1.4. Measures 
Participants again completed the seven-item CRT[19; 41], the two 12-item forms of 
the Belief Bias Syllogisms task[37], and the same VAS scales assessing average pain, 
maximum pain, and pain intrusiveness. 
 
3.1.5. Procedure 
Ethical approval for the study was granted from the University of Bath Department of 
Psychology and Department for Health ethics boards. After giving informed consent, the 
temperature of the thermode was chosen for each participant to meet the criteria of being at 
least 44°C and 7/10 on a NRS. Next, participants completed the CRT task with or without 
pain, then the syllogisms task twice, once with warm but non-painful heat and once with 
painful heat. The order of pain conditions was counterbalanced. 
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After completing the reasoning tasks participants completed the VAS scales on paper 
and some demographics questions on the computer using E-Prime Professional 2.0.  When all 
tasks had been completed the participants were paid and debriefed. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Data availability 
The data and SPSS analysis scripts for these experiments are available at 
https://figshare.com/s/a55106b572b7c4a1329d. 
 
3.2.2. VAS ratings 
The mean VAS response to the question “How much pain did you feel during the pain 
condition of the task?” was 62.75 out of 100 (SD = 11.72), ranging from 28 to 87, which was 
significantly different from zero, t(45) = 36.33, p < .001, d = 5.35, but did not differ between 
males (M = 61.83, SD = 8.28) and females (M = 63.46, SD = 13.92), t(44) = .47, p = .644, d 
= .142. The mean response to the question “How much pain did you feel when the heat pain 
was at its most intense?” was 76.33 (SD = 10.94), which was also significantly different from 
zero, t(45) = 47.31, p < .001, d = 6.98, and did not differ between males (M = 75.15, SD = 
9.67) and females (M = 77.23, SD = 11.94), t(44) = .635, p = .529, d = .191. Finally, the 
mean response to the question “How intrusive/distracting did the pain seem to you?” was 
56.07 (SD = 19.68), which was significantly different from zero, t(45) = 19.32, p < .001, d = 
2.85, and significantly higher in females (M = 61.12, SD = 17.94) than in males (M = 49.50, 
SD = 20.34), t(44) = 2.05, p = .046, d = .606. Overall, these results suggest that participants 
perceived the heat stimulus to be painful and that they (particularly females) perceived this 
pain to be distracting. 
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3.2.3. The effect of pain on task performance 
3.2.3.1. CRT 
We again examined scores on the original three CRT items and well as scores on the full 
seven items. The number of correct answers for each measure was compared across the pain 
and no pain conditions with Mann-Whitney U tests. For CRT3 scores, there was no 
difference between the pain (M = .83, SD = .1.05) and no pain (M = 1.10, SD = .97) 
conditions, U(46) = 217, z = -1.10, p = .273, r = .162. For CRT7 scores, there was again no 
difference between the pain (M = 2.46, SD = 1.89) and no pain (M = 3.23, SD = 1.80) 
conditions, U(46) = 192.5, z = -1.601, p = .109, r = .236.  
Bayesian Mann-Whitney U tests on the effects of pain on CRT3 and CRT7 scores, with a 
default Cauchy prior of 0.707, found anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis for 
both CRT3, BF_01 = 2.30, and CRT7 scores, BF_01 = 1.71. 
Within the participants who completed the CRT in pain, there was no correlation 
between CRT3 scores and average pain intensity, rs (24) = .375, p = .071, nor between CRT7 
scores and average pain intensity, rs (24) = .251, p = .237.  
Bayesian correlations between pain intensity scores and CRT3 scores, and between 
pain intensity scores and CRT7 scores, indicated weak evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypotheses for CRT3 scores, BF_10 = 3.11, and anecdotal evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis for CRT7 scores, BF_01 = 2.69. 
 
3.2.3.2. Belief Bias Syllogisms  
Endorsement rates for the syllogisms were entered into a 2 (pain condition: pain, no 
pain)  3 (believability: believable, neutral, unbelievable)  2 (validity: valid, invalid)  2 
(sex: male, female) ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of believability, F(2,88) = 
25.65, p < .001,  ηp2 = .368, where participants endorsed believable conclusions (M = 71.5%, 
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SD = 21.05) more often than neutral conclusions (M = 61.1%, SD = 19.0), p < .001, and 
neutral conclusions more often than unbelievable conclusions (M = 49.6%, SD = 23.1), p < 
.001. There was a significant main effect of validity, F(1,44) = 112.67, p < .001,  ηp2 = .719, 
where participants endorsed valid conclusions (M = 85.8%, SD = 13.6) more often than 
invalid conclusions (M = 35.6%, SD = 30.5), again as expected. There was also a significant 
main effect of Sex, F(1,44) = 4.30, p = .044,  ηp2 = .089, where women endorsed more 
conclusions (M = 66.0%, SD = 17.3) than men (M = 55.4%, SD = 17.0). 
There was a significant interaction between believability and validity, F(2,88) = 8.61, 
p < .001,  ηp2 = .164. Further investigation showed that there was a main effect of 
believability on endorsement rates both within the valid items, F(2,90) = 11.33, p < .001,  ηp2 
= .201, and within the invalid items, F(2,90) = 27.58, p < .001  ηp2 = .380. For the valid 
items, there was no significant difference in endorsement rates for believable (M = 91.3%, SD 
= 14.9) and neutral items (M = 89.7%, SD = 16.3), p = .519, but both differed significantly 
from unbelievable items (M = 76.6%, SD = 23.1), both ps = .001. For the invalid items, 
believable items were endorsed more often (M = 53.3%, SD = 36.6) than neutral items (M = 
34.2%, SD = 37.3), p < .001, which in turn were endorsed more often than unbelievable items 
(M = 23.4%, SD = 32.6), p = .008. Notably, valid items were highly endorsed whether they 
were believable, neutral or unbelievable (with endorsement rates significantly higher than 
chance level for all three, all ps < .001), whereas invalid items were endorsed less often than 
not only when they were neutral (p = .006) or unbelievable (p < .001). Contrary to logic, 
believable but invalid items were not rejected more often than would be expected by chance, 
p = .550. Again, this replicates findings from previous investigations of the task, which are 
attributed to selective scrutiny of unbelievable syllogisms.  
There was a significant interaction between Validity and Sex, F(1,44) = 4.30, p = 
.044,  ηp2 = .089, where females endorsed significantly more invalid items (M = 45.8%, SD = 
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28.4) than males (M = 25.4%, SD = 32.8), t(44) = 2.26, p = .029, while there was no 
difference in the number of valid items endorsed between males (M = 85.4%, SD = 15.7) and 
females (M = 86.2%, SD = 10.8), t(44) = .205, p = .839. 
There was no main effect of pain on endorsement rates, F(1,44) = 1.82, p = .184,  ηp2 = 
.040, however, there was a significant interaction between Pain, Validity and Believability, 
F(2,88) = 3.44, p = .036,  ηp2 = .073. To locate the source of this three-way interaction, we 
ran a Pain  Validity ANOVA separately for the believable, neutral and unbelievable items. 
For believable items, there was a significant interaction between Pain and Validity F(1,45) = 
5.37, p = .025,  ηp2 = .107 (see Figure 2). Although not significant at the simple main effect 
level, endorsement rates for invalid items were lower when participants were in pain (M = 
47.8%, SD = 39.3) compared to not in pain (M = 58.7%, SD = 44.1), t(45) = 1.88, p = .067, 
whereas endorsement rates for valid items were higher when participants were in pain (M = 
93.5%, SD = 17.0) compared to when they were not in pain (M = 89.1%, SD = 21.0), t(45) = 
1.27, p = .209 (i.e. a cross-over interaction). There was no interaction between Pain and 
Validity for either neutral, F(1,45) = 2.46, p = .124,  ηp2 = .052, or unbelievable items, 
F(1,45) < .001, p = 1.000,  ηp2 < .001.  
All other effects were non-significant (all ps > .318, ηp2 < .023).  
We also conducted a Bayesian ANOVA on syllogisms endorsement rates with 
Believability, Validity, Pain Condition and Sex as factors. Again, we used Rouder et al.’s 
[36] default prior width of h = 0.5. This revealed that the best-fitting model included 
Believability, Validity, Sex, Believability  Validity and Sex  Validity, P(model|data) = .49. 
There was weak evidence against the model that additionally included pain, BF_01=3.80, and 
very strong evidence against the model that additionally included Pain and all interactions 
with Pain, BF_01= 3133. 
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3.3. Experiment 2 Discussion 
In Experiment 2, where the pain condition was made more painful, pain seemed to 
improve performance on believable items by making participants more likely to endorse valid 
items and less likely to endorse invalid items, compared to the pain-free condition. However, 
this effect differs from Experiment 1 and was not predicted. The key methodological 
difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was that we ensured that the participants 
experienced a pain intensity of at least 7/10 in Experiment 2, which we did not do in 
Experiment 1.  We had expected this higher-intensity pain to disrupt participants’ 
performance, but finding the opposite led us to hypothesise that pain above a certain intensity 
may actually cue participants to increase their effort in order to protect their task 
performance.  
In Experiment 3, we directly manipulated pain intensity within-subjects to allow us to 
test this hypothesis. Participants completed CRT and syllogisms items in no pain, low-
intensity pain and high-intensity pain conditions. We predicted that performance would 
decline in the low-intensity pain condition relative to the no pain condition, and improve in 
the high-intensity pain condition compared to the low-intensity pain condition. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 38 students and staff (27 females, 9 males, 2 missing data due to 
technical error) from the University of Bath and Bath Spa University, aged 19-53 years (M = 
27.54, SD = 6.23). All reported being free from pain at the time of the study. Due to the small 
number of male participants, we did not explore sex differences in this study.  
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4.1.2. Design 
Participants completed versions of the CRT and Belief Bias Syllogisms tasks that 
were altered to allow for three within-groups pain conditions (described below). We also 
included two additional measures: a short version of Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices, and confidence ratings after each syllogism. If pain had any effects on the 
Syllogisms or CRT tasks, we wanted to be able to see whether it was mediated by changes to 
confidence (self-rated) or cognitive capacity (measured by Raven’s Matrices). For example, 
if high intensity pain did improve reasoning performance by acting as a cue to task difficulty, 
as predicted, participants may feel less confident in their syllogism responses in the high 
intensity pain condition compared to the low intensity condition, and should perform better 
on the Raven’s Matrices task as well. Pain intensity was directly manipulated in order to 
experimentally investigate the effect of pain intensity on task performance. Each task was 
performed in three within-groups conditions: no pain, low intensity pain, and high intensity 
pain. 
 
4.1.3. Pain induction 
A Medoc Pathway Advanced Thermal Stimulator (ATS) was again used for heat pain 
induction, but in this experiment the thermode was placed on the participant’s left ankle 
instead of their wrist. This was because participants were invited to take part in another pain-
related experiment after this one, and those who did experienced pain to their hand and wrist 
via a cold pressor. We aimed to minimise the exposure of any one body area to pain induction 
procedures over the course of the two experiments.  
The procedure began by finding each participants’ pain threshold, using the procedure 
from Study 1. Participants increased the thermode temperature until it first became painful 
and remained painful but tolerable for 15 seconds. An average of three trials was taken as the 
Reasoning in pain  
 
23 
participant’s threshold. This temperature was then applied to the pulses programme, and the 
participant experienced this for 30 seconds then rated the pain intensity on a 0-10 NRS, 
where 0 was labelled ‘no pain’, 2 was labelled ‘mild pain’, 4-5 was labelled ‘moderate pain’, 
7-8 was labelled ‘high pain’, and 10 was labelled ‘maximum tolerable pain’.  
In order to identify temperatures for the low and high pain intensity conditions, the 
temperature was then adjusted using a staircase method, first going 2 degrees up, then 1 
degree down, with the participant experiencing the pulses programme for 30 seconds at each 
temperature and rating the pain intensity on the 0 – 10 NRS. This continued until an NRS 
rating of 8 or 9 was reached (whichever was reached first). The temperatures rated as 2 out of 
10 (or 3 if the staircase method did not produce a rating of 2) and 7 out of 10 (8 if the 
staircase method did not produce a rating of 7) were selected for the low and high pain 
intensity conditions, respectively. In the no pain condition, the baseline temperature of 32 
degrees was applied. 
 
4.1.4. Measures 
4.1.4.1. Cognitive Reflection Test 
Contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, the CRT was administered in the three pain 
conditions within-groups, by splitting it into three 2-item blocks (items counterbalanced). 
This allowed us to experimentally investigate the effect of pain intensity on performance. Six 
items were selected using the performance data given by Toplak, West & Stanovich [39]: 
items 1-6 were included and item 7 (the stocks question) was excluded because it showed the 
lowest correlation with the original three items. 
 
4.1.4.2. Belief Bias Syllogisms 
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We used a different version of the syllogisms task for Experiment 3, based on recent 
research by Trippas and colleagues [42; 43]. This version allowed for more items per-
condition and had previously been used alongside confidence ratings. After each question, 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in their answer from 1 (not confident) to 3 
(very confident). Participants saw 16 different syllogisms in each of the no pain, low pain and 
high pain conditions, with the same item structures but different content in each condition. 
Half of the 16 syllogisms in each condition were valid and half invalid. Half had believable 
conclusions and half had unbelievable conclusions (there were no belief-neutral items). 
Premise believability was controlled for using pseudo-word middle terms, so that the belief or 
disbelief stemmed only from the conclusion (e.g. No birds are pinds; Some pinds are parrots; 
Some parrots are not birds). 
 
4.1.4.3. Raven’s Matrices 
An 18-item subset of items from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices [35] was 
used as a measure of cognitive capacity [37; 39]. The 18 items were split into three lists of six 
items (list one: items 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16; list two: items 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17; and list three; items 
3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18). The lists were counterbalanced by pain condition. Six items cannot be 
considered a comprehensive measure of cognitive capacity, rather, this was intended as a 
proxy measure given the time constraints of pain induction procedures. 
 
4.1.4.4. VAS ratings 
After the low and high pain conditions, participants completed the same three VAS 
ratings used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
4.1.5. Procedure 
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Ethical approval for the study was granted from the University of Bath Department of 
Psychology and Department for Health ethics boards. After giving informed consent, the 
temperature of the thermode was chosen for each participant for each condition as described 
above. Next, participants completed practice blocks of the CRT, Raven’s and Syllogisms 
tasks without pain. Participants then completed the main blocks of the three tasks under the 
no pain, low pain and high pain conditions. The order of these conditions was 
counterbalanced by E-Prime, and the order of the three tasks within each pain condition was 
also counterbalanced by E-Prime. Participants completed the VAS scales on paper at the end 
of the low and high intensity pain segments. When all tasks had been completed the 
participants were paid and debriefed. The majority of participants then remained in the 
laboratory to take part in a separate study. 
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Data availability 
The data and SPSS analysis scripts for these experiments are available at 
https://figshare.com/s/a55106b572b7c4a1329d. 
 
4.2.2. VAS ratings 
The mean VAS response to the question “How painful was the heat on average?” was 
26.10 (SD = 17.79) in the low pain condition and 67.45 (SD = 18.15) in the high pain 
condition. These significantly differed from each other, p < .001, d = 2.30, and from zero, 
both ps < .001, both ds > 1.47. The mean response to the question “How much pain did you 
feel when the heat pain was at its most intense?” was 30.26 (SD = 20.29) in the low pain 
condition and 76.77 (SD = 17.81) in the high pain condition. These significantly differed 
from each other, p < .001, d = 2.44 and from zero, both ps < .001, both ds > 1.49. Finally, the 
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mean response to the question “How intrusive/distracting did the pain seem to you?” was 
24.87 (SD = 19.84) in the low pain condition and 67.52 (SD = 22.29) in the high pain 
condition. These significantly differed from each other, p < .001, d = 2.02, and from zero, 
both ps < .001, both ds > 1.25. These results suggest that the pain manipulations were 
successful and that the pain was subjectively distracting in both conditions. 
 
4.2.3. The effect of pain on task performance 
4.2.3.1. CRT 
A Friedman’s Test found no effect of pain condition on the number of CRT items 
answered correctly,  𝜒2 (2) = .286, p = .867. Effect sizes for Friedman’s test can be calculated 
from Wilcoxon’s tests on the paired comparisons [17], which in this case were all small (rs < 
.092).  
A Bayesian ANOVA on CRT scores with Pain Condition as a factor and Rouder et 
al.’s [36] default prior width of h = 0.5 revealed that the best-fitting model was the null 
model, P(model|data) = .91. There was moderate evidence against a model that additionally 
included Pain, BF_01 = 9.99. 
 
4.2.3.2. Raven’s Matrices 
 An ANOVA found no effect of pain condition on the number of Raven’s Matrices 
answered correctly, F(2,74) = 1.33, p = .270,  ηp2 = .035, ηG2  = .010.  
A Bayesian ANOVA examining the effect of pain condition on the number of Raven’s 
Matrices answered correctly using Rouder et al.’s [36] default prior width of h = 0.5 found 
that the best-fitting model was the null model, P(model|data) = .80. There was moderate 
evidence against a model that additionally included Pain, BF_01 = 4.09. 
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4.2.3.3. Belief Bias Syllogisms (endorsement rates) 
 A 3 (Pain: none, low-intensity, high-intensity) × 2 (Validity: Valid, Invalid) × 2 
(Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) ANOVA on syllogism endorsement rates showed a 
significant main effect of Validity, F(1,37) = 59.10, p < .001,  ηp2 = .615, with higher 
endorsement of valid inferences (M = 75.7%, SD = 15.4) than invalid inferences (M = 53.5%, 
SD = 17.9). There was a significant main effect of Believability, F(1,37) = 20.80, p < .001,  
ηp2 = .360, with higher endorsement of believable items (M = 74.3%, SD = 17.9) than 
unbelievable items (M = 55.0%, SD = 20.3). The interaction between Validity and 
Believability did not reach significance, F(1,37) = 4.03, p = .052,  ηp2 = .098. There was no 
main effect of Pain, F(2,74) = .37, p = .694,  ηp2 = .010. All other effects were non-
significant, ps > .195, ηp2 < .044. 
A Bayesian version of this ANOVA using Rouder et al.’s [36] default prior width of h = 
0.5 revealed that the best-fitting model included Believability, Validity, and Believability ×
 Validity, P(model|data) = .73. There was very strong evidence against the model that 
additionally included Pain, BF_01 = 32.22, and very strong evidence against the model that 
additionally included Pain and all interactions with Pain, BF_01= 58.46.     
 
4.2.3.4. Belief Bias Syllogisms (confidence ratings) 
 A 3 (Pain: none, low-intensity, high-intensity) × 2 (Validity: Valid, Invalid) × 2 
(Believability: Believable, Unbelievable) ANOVA on syllogism confidence ratings showed a 
significant main effect of Validity, F(1,37) = 16.88, p < .001,  ηp2 = .313, with higher 
confidence for valid inferences (M = 2.37, SD = 0.39) than invalid inferences (M = 2.18, SD 
= 0.43). All other effects were non-significant, ps > .054, ηp2 < .076.  
A Bayesian ANOVA on syllogisms confidence ratings with Believability, Validity, and 
Pain Condition as factors and Rouder et al.’s [36] default prior width of h = 0.5 found that the 
Reasoning in pain  
 
28 
best-fitting model included only Validity, P(model|data) = .70. There was moderate evidence 
against the model that additionally included Pain, BF_01 = 5.00, and strong evidence against 
the model that additionally included Pain and its interaction with validity, BF_01= 13.69.     
 
4.3. Experiment 3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 showed no effects of pain on syllogisms performance, syllogisms 
confidence, CRT performance, or Raven’s Matrices performance. Our hypothesis that 
reasoning performance would be poorer in the low intensity pain condition relative to the no 
pain condition, and better in the high intensity pain condition than low intensity pain 
condition, was therefore not supported. 
 
5. General Discussion 
In a series of three experiments we found no clear evidence to support the hypothesis that 
laboratory-induced pain negatively influences reasoning, in particular the ability to inhibit 
intuitive but incorrect responses (Cognitive Reflection Test), the ability to distinguish valid 
and invalid arguments with belief-laden content (the Belief Bias Syllogisms Task), and the 
ability to distinguish valid and invalid deductions from abstract conditional statements 
(Conditional Inference Task).  We found no evidence to support our general argument that 
the small but persistent negative effect of pain on attention and executive functioning should 
lead to negative effects of pain on tests of logical reasoning, since those tasks of reasoning 
necessarily involve ‘Type 2’ processes such as working memory updating, attentional 
switching, and inhibition of automatic responding. 
Reporting and interpreting negative findings is always fraught with interpretative danger, 
although it is a necessary task [25]. There are two broad conclusions one might draw from 
these findings. First, that our hypotheses are incorrect and that reasoning, as captured in these 
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tasks, is unaffected by induced pain. Second, that there is an effect of pain on reasoning, but 
it is not shown using these methods (i.e., we made a Type II error). We discuss each of these 
possibilities in turn. 
If reasoning is not affected by pain, this could be explained in several ways. It may be 
that some of the component processes involved in reasoning are unaffected by pain and able 
to compensate for processes which are affected by pain. Or, it may be that participants find 
these tasks engaging enough to hold their attention away from the pain [45]. Alternatively, it 
may be that effort on these tasks increases in a linear fashion as pain increases, so that any 
disruptive effect of pain on task performance is counteracted by increased effort. We suggest 
that the first two explanations are more plausible than the third. While the first two 
explanations are consistent with finding disruptive effects of pain on more basic attention 
tasks that have been studied previously, but null effects on reasoning tasks, the third does not 
clearly differentiate between different types of tasks. Our motivation for Experiment 3 was 
that high-intensity pain may prompt participants to put more effort into the task, whereas 
lower intensity pain may not. In this case we would expect lower-intensity pain to be 
associated with poorer task performance and higher-intensity pain to be associated with better 
task performance than low-intensity pain (it could be better, poorer or similar to performance 
without pain). We did not find any evidence for this hypothesis. If effort did increase linearly 
with pain intensity then that would be consistent with our null results, but difficult to 
reconcile with previous studies showing effects of pain on attention tasks. 
In order for us to confidently assert that pain does not disrupt reasoning, we need further 
evidence of non-effects, with independent replication of these experiments using identical 
tasks and procedures, and conceptual replications using other reasoning tasks and other 
painful stimuli, with Bayes factors providing support for the null hypothesis. Uncertainty is 
reduced as negative effects amass.  
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If there is an effect of pain on reasoning, but we made a Type II error in failing to reject 
the null hypothesis, then the promising candidates for the source of our error are the primary 
task(s), the pain challenge, the sample size and the experimental context. Most tests of 
attention and memory provide indices of error and response time, and we expect in many 
situations a strategic trade-off between them. Here we focused on error only. It is possible 
that people compensate with time in order to maximise performance. Indeed, the finding that 
time pressure has been shown to influence task performance is relevant [12; 13; 22]. Previous 
studies that have considered both response times and accuracy have not found clear evidence 
of a trade-off. In some cases, pain is associated with lower accuracies but no significant 
change to response times [6], while in other cases pain is associated with both lower 
accuracies and longer response times [4,7], or, consistent with a speed-accuracy trade-off, 
longer response times and no significant effect on accuracies [4,7]. Given these 
inconsistencies, we recommend that future research considers the effects of pain on response 
times as well as on error rates. 
Some of our tasks suffered from a lack of room for variance, particularly the CRT and 
syllogisms confidence ratings in Experiment 3. It is possible that with more items in the CRT, 
and a wider scale for giving confidence ratings, these analyses would have shown effects of 
pain. On the other hand, the Bayesian analyses of these measures found moderate evidence 
against effects of pain.  
We used only one pain challenge in these experiments. Although we made sure it was 
painful, the pain was short-lived with a distinct temporal on- and off-set. It is possible that a 
sustained pain stimulus, such as a cold-pressor, would be a more complex and effective 
challenge. Further, most laboratory tasks are de facto unthreatening ─ the key function of 
pain to signal harm is diminished. Needed here, perhaps, are tasks that are a closer analogue 
to real-world pain [31]. It is possible that naturally-occurring pain would influence reasoning 
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behaviour in a way that experimental pain did not in these experiments. Recent studies have 
found that while experimental pain did not change abstract thinking behaviour [1], the 
intensity of clinical pain did [23]. The benefit of using experimental pain is that we can 
isolate the effects of pain from the effects of confounds such as other health problems, 
depression, and pain-related anxiety. Where it is found that clinical pain but not experimental 
pain disrupts cognition, this may suggest that the cause of the disruption is not pain itself, but 
something that commonly co-occurs with pain in clinical samples. Our use of exclusively 
experimental pain limits the generalisability of our findings, but provides an important 
element of our larger understanding of how pain interacts with cognition.   
Our sample sizes were modest, but given that there were no consistent non-significant 
trends between the three experiments, and that our Bayesian analyses found support for the 
null hypothesis in many cases, lack of power is unlikely to be the reason we failed to reject 
the null hypotheses. We have not computed observed power or sensitivity due to issues that 
have been identified with this approach [24]. Nevertheless, future investigations should be 
powered to find the smallest effect sizes of interest, and sample sizes and analysis plans 
should be pre-registered on a service such as the Open Science Framework (www.osf.io) or 
As Predicted (www.aspredicted.org) [30].  
Finally, the participants were students at a University, and may be less susceptible to 
errors of reasoning, or more primed to be careful in task performance. Recruiting from the 
general population would be beneficial in this regard. 
We are keen to broaden the study of the influence of pain on cognition and behaviour to 
include macro-investigation of people making real decisions, in addition to the micro-
investigations of error rates and response times on laboratory tasks. Despite these negative 
findings, we believe that investigating the effect of pain on real-world decisions is the right 
direction of travel for this research. This will inevitably mean that we need to invest in 
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methods development, in the measurement of key attentional features such as interruption [2], 
in better human pain models [31] and in sampling from people with pain in both planned and 
accidental acute pain environments, and in various chronic pain environments. Similarly, we 
will need to make our tasks more relevant to real world goals, for example attending to goal-
relevant information [28; 45] or reasoning about analgesic decisions. 
If future work goes on to find support for the hypothesis that pain disrupts higher-level 
cognitive processes, such as reasoning, it will be important to investigate the role of 
biopsychosocial factors in this effect, including sex and gender[18; 26; 34], and pain-related 
anxiety, fear and catastrophizing[44; 47]. 
In summary, we report three experiments showing no significant effect of pain on 
reasoning. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that reasoning is unaffected by pain. 
We are committed to the publication of null results and recognize that this is increasingly rare 
in science [16]. However, the major challenge remains one of interpretation. The absence of 
any effect is theoretically troubling, and before accepting the null hypothesis, we suggest 
further investigation. Candidate next steps are to broaden the measurement of reasoning, to 
introduce longer duration pain protocols, and to make task demands motivationally salient.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of valid and invalid items endorsed as a function of their believability in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2. Pain by Validity interaction within the believable syllogisms in Experiment 2. Error 
bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
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